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Abstract
Welfare chauvinism first appeared in academic literature when Norwegian and Danish political
parties began framing immigration as a threat to the social democratic system’s survival; since
then, it has become a cornerstone of populist ideology in Europe. A form of quasi-retrenchment,
welfare chauvinism has been advanced in Denmark by the Danish People’s Party (DF), which
sees immigration as a threat to the welfare state and presents chauvinism as the cure – pursuing
one form of retrenchment to “prevent” another. DF’s electoral popularity puts the Social
Democratic party (S) between a rock and a hard place, torn between the electoral necessities of
accommodating chauvinism and maintaining support for the welfare state. In this paper, I argue
that indirect retrenchment is too politically costly an option for S to pursue; instead, it will
accommodate DF’s chauvinism by supporting direct retrenchment. I hypothesize that, via votes
in the Danish parliament from 2004 to 2019, S has attempted to make it more difficult to obtain
citizenship and residency rights (thus making it more difficult to obtain benefits) and make it
easier for these rights, and thus the benefits, to be revoked. My findings broadly, but tentatively,
support this claim. I also find that S has supported a third form of direct retrenchment:
encouraging repatriation of foreigners to their home countries, which would entail a loss of
benefits.
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Introduction
Welfare chauvinism has become one of the cornerstones of European populist parties’
ideologies; in Denmark, it has found its political home with the Danish People’s Party (DF), the
country’s third largest party. The term ‘welfare chauvinism’ was coined by 1990 by scholars
studying the Danish and Norwegian populist parties seeking to restrict who was eligible to
receive welfare benefits and promoting the exclusion of immigrants from the social system
(Andersen and Bjorklund 1990); since then, it has become a concept applicable to almost all of
Europe’s populist rightwing parties. The Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, France’s National
Rally (formerly National Front), and Austria’s Freedom Party – currently a partner in the
governmental coalition – include welfare chauvinism in their policies and platforms (Cornago
Bonal and Zollinger 2018). For DF, policies welfare state and immigration meet at the nexus of
“welfare chauvinism”: support of welfare only for the natives that have contributed to it, and
opposition to welfare’s extension to anyone else (Careja et al 2017).
DF was one of the first welfare chauvinistic parties in Europe and its rise influenced other
populist parties to adopt its rhetoric. Though originally critical of welfare spending, DF reacted
to welfare cuts by mainstream parties by becoming supportive of welfare policies. It tried to
instigate opposition to immigration and multiculturalism by framing immigrants as threats to the
welfare state and has benefitted electorally by doing so (Schumacher ad van Kersbergen 2016).
DF frames positively its welfare chauvinism as a patriotic duty. “We are bound by out Danish
cultural heritage and our responsibility towards each other as people,” its manifesto reads. “For
this reason, we wish to strengthen our country’s internal and external security.” For the party,
protecting welfare for Danes necessitates limits on who might become Danish. “Denmark is not
an immigrant country and never has been,” continues the manifesto. “We will not accept
transformation to a multiethnic society” (Dansk Folkeparti 2019).
In analyzing welfare chauvinism, Denmark is an intriguing, and useful, case. In addition
to being one of the first countries in which the phenomenon was observed and documented by
academic literature, a shift towards chauvinistic exclusionism contradicts the general paradigm
of Scandinavian welfare generosity. Van der Waal et al (2013), testing their hypothesis that the
three worlds of welfare capitalism – liberal, conservative and social democratic (Scandinavian) –
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were likely to derive “three worlds of welfare chauvinism” (164), found that the Scandinavian
regime was the least likely to restrict immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. The research fit
with existing literature. Larsen (2008) found that countries under the social democratic
(Scandinavian) regime tended to make fewer distinctions about who was “entitled” to welfare
and who was not, compared to countries under the other two regimes. Van Oorschot (2006)
found that Europeans viewed immigrants as less deserving of welfare than natives but noted that
this finding was least applicable in social-democratic countries. That Denmark has a populist
party that espouses welfare chauvinism is not, in itself, surprising; what is more surprising, and
worthier of study, is the proliferation of such an attitude across the political spectrum.
DF’s electoral success has strengthened its role as legislative, if not governmental,
kingmaker, compounding the influence that the Danish political structure already affords it.
Structurally, Denmark’s political system helps welfare chauvinism permeate the political arena.
A parliamentary democracy with nine political parties represented in Parliament, it is prone to
minority governments that almost always rely upon support from non-government parties in
order to pass legislation. DF’s ability to become kingmaker in the legislative process compels
mainstream parties to accommodate its anti-immigration platform to a greater degree than a more
majoritarian system would (Careja et al 2017). The current coalition government, led by Prime
Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen (Venstre) is comprised of Venstre (henceforth referred to as V),
the Liberal Alliance (henceforth referred to as LA), and the Conservative People’s Party (KF). It
relies upon support from the Danish People’s Party (DF) to pass legislation. The Social
Democrats (S), Radical Liberals (RV), Alternative (ALT), and the Red-Green Alliance (EL) are
in opposition.
Faced with electorally-popular competition from DF, Danish mainstream parties have
been compelled to respond. Willingness to shelter refugees in Denmark is no longer a given for
the country’s centrist parties. “They are unwanted in Denmark,” Minister of Immigration and
Integration Inger Stojberg, of the center-right Venstre party, said of asylum seekers with criminal
records whose applications were rejected. “And they will feel that.” Prime Minister Lars Lokke
Rasmussen, also of Venstre, indicated Denmark’s unwillingness to allow refugees seeking
temporary protections to enjoy the permanent benefits of residency and citizenship. “It’s not easy
to ask families to go home,” he told listeners at a party event, “but it’s the morally right thing.
We should not make refugees immigrants” (Sorensen 2018). Mette Fredericksen, leader of the
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center-left Social Democrats, shared similar sentiments. “More have come than we have been
able to effectively integrate,” she said of refugees. “We [the Social Democrats] will take control
back” (Hamilton 2018).
Mette Frederiksen, leader of the Social Democrats, in an article written for the March
2018 Financial Times, argued that Europe’s center-left parties could reestablish their electoral
share only by heeding popular concerns. “The rise of populism is rooted in a genuine sense of
insecurity,” she argued. “And voters cannot be blamed for reacting when the fruits of
globalization are distributed unjustly (2018). The article focuses on the relationship “between
markets and people” and makes no explicit reference to migration, but inherent in Frederiksen’s
argument is admission of S’s need to adapt to changing voter preferences. One such changing
preference involves immigration, and disillusionment with the center-left has caused S’s
traditional supporters to defect in favor of DF.
In this paper, I argue that that some forms of retrenchment will be too electorally costly
for S to pursue; instead, it will seek to retrench directly, explicitly restricting immigrants’ access
to the social benefits provided by Denmark’s welfare system. I argue that S, via its voting in the
Folketing (Danish Parliament), will retrench in two ways: by restricting immigrants’ access to
the citizenship and residency rights upon which the conference of welfare benefits depends and
by making it easier for these rights, and thus the benefits, to be revoked. I draw on the
framework developed by Careja et al (2017) that distinguishes between indirect and direct
welfare chauvinism. Indirect welfare chauvinism, which retrenches welfare generally but
disproportionately affects foreigners’ access to benefits, is costlier for S than direct retrenchment,
which explicitly excludes foreigners from receiving benefits. Accommodating welfare
chauvinism and maintaining support for the welfare state are both electoral necessities for S – the
former because it allows the party to retain the voters likely to defect to DF, and the latter
because it allows the party to retain the voters likely to defect to other leftist parties if S
compromises its support for robust welfare policies. To respond to both pressures, I argue that S
pursues two specific courses of action. First, it will seek to limit foreigners’ access to the
citizenship and residency rights necessary for obtaining benefits. Second, it will seek to make it
easier to revoke those rights, thus revoking the right to access the benefits.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I lay out the theoretical framework of welfare
chauvinism and of my argument. Second, I review the literature on welfare chauvinism, with
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emphasis on how it relates to the Danish case, and outline what this paper contributes to the
topic’s study. Third, I will provide an overview of the “state of play” in Denmark’s political
arena, providing three case studies of unsuccessful proposals that attest to political parties’
voting behavior on proposed welfare retrenchment. Finally, I present and discuss my results and
evaluate my hypothesis. Tables outlining each vote analyzed, with brief content summaries, can
be found in the appendix.

Theoretical Framework
Direct and indirect chauvinism are both forms of welfare retrenchment and are
ostensibly, and sometimes expressly, aimed at limiting foreigners’ access to welfare benefits.
Different forms of chauvinism, however, have implications that a political party – especially a
center-left party that seeks and claims to defend the welfare state – must consider. Direct
chauvinism is levied directly and exclusively against immigrants and involves the group being
explicitly excluded from benefits. Indirect chauvinism has a broad target group, but
disproportionately affects immigrants, and occurs when welfare is retrenched and when welfare
is made conditional upon recipients’ adherence to certain criteria. Indirect chauvinism thus
retrenches welfare in general, though foreigners are often the most affected; for example,
because foreigners tend to have more children than natives, a policy reducing child benefit would
disproportionately impact immigrants as a group. Likewise, a policy making child benefit
conditional upon parents’ working hours would negatively impact immigrants, who tend to
participate in the labor force at a lower rate than natives (Careja et al 2017).
When welfare chauvinist parties increase their electoral share, mainstream parties may
respond in three ways. They can accommodate welfare chauvinism by adopting the policies and
language of the populist parties, thereby including welfare chauvinism in their own ideologies
and policies. They can attack welfare chauvinism by directly opposing it and supporting policies
that recognize equality, rejecting exclusionism in favor of universalism. They can ignore welfare
chauvinism and carry on with existing platforms, not accounting for the welfare chauvinist
parties. In general, the decision to respond via accommodation or attack is influenced by
mainstream parties’ expectation that welfare chauvinism will have electoral consequences.
Mainstream right-wing parties tend to become more supportive of welfare and less supportive of
multiculturalism when populist parties exhibit welfare chauvinism, while mainstream left-wing
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parties tend to maintain their already high support for welfare and become less supportive of
multiculturalism. This was evidenced after 1998, when DF’s participation in national elections
caused a shift against multiculturalism and towards welfare support among all Danish political
parties except RV, thus resulting in generally, albeit limited, accommodating responses
(Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016).
Although Danish mainstream political parties accommodate DF’s welfare chauvinism out
of political and electoral necessity, they approach welfare and retrenchment in different ways. In
Denmark, support for the welfare state exists across all parties; no party seeks to radically
retrench the welfare state, although stance on retrenchment tends to be partisan. Leftist parties
tend to advocate generous and universal welfare systems and expanding immigrants’ rights so
that they may partake of welfare benefits. Rightwing parties in welfare states, on the other hand,
are likely to support closing the welfare system to foreigners (Koopmans et al 2012). Welfare
retrenchment, especially in countries like Denmark where the welfare state is popular, is a
politically unpopular measure. Parties that retrench thus must engage in blame avoidance to
mediate the electoral impacts of retrenchment. One blame avoidance strategy involves grouping
welfare recipients into “deserving” and “undeserving” categories and framing retrenchment as a
necessary measure to reduce the burden that the “undeserving” place on the system (Ermark ad
Schoop 2017). The Danish case reflects these blame avoidance strategies; while the Danish
People’s Party perceives a threat to the welfare state from all foreigners’ access to its benefits,
other Danish parties qualify their welfare chauvinism. The Social Democrats have emphasized
immigrants’ integration potential, introducing a social element to the discussion surrounding who
deserves what in Denmark. Venstre’s concerns are more market-related, and the party seeks to
reserve benefits for workers whose contributions to the system will, at least in the long term,
balance out the benefits they receive. Two types of welfare chauvinism are thus distinguishable:
the neoliberal, market-based chauvinism, and the socially-focused, solidarity-based chauvinism,
employed by the right and left wing respectively (Jorgensen and Thomsen 2016: 331).
That populist parties promote welfare chauvinism, and that mainstream parties
accommodate it for electoral reasons, has been established. What is less clear is how parties
retrench when anti-immigrant chauvinism and welfare state maintenance (or expansion) when
both concerns are equally electorally pressing. Indirect welfare chauvinism retrenches the
welfare state for all of its users, including natives; and is likely to entail electoral consequences
Carstens 6

for a center-left party like S that is keen to be seen as a defender – and even expander – of the
welfare state. My research sheds light on how welfare-supportive political parties respond to
welfare chauvinism and fills an important gap in the existing literature.

Literature Review: the Political Salience of Migration
As Freeman (1986) notes, national welfare systems are necessarily closed systems; that
is, they provide benefits to members (citizens) and exclude non-members (non-citizens) from
those benefits. In order for a welfare state to function, citizens must share a sense of solidarity;
that is, they must recognize their common membership and identify this membership as the
necessary condition for sharing social benefits. By its nature, this process implies the existence
of non-members, who are excluded from sharing in the welfare state’s benefits. The fact that
welfare states are generally ethnically homogeneous and correspond to nation-state boundaries
makes it difficult for foreigners to integrate and be seen as members on equal footing with
natives (Grodem 2016). This exacerbates the challenge that migration poses to welfare states as
it erodes the social consensus – the solidarity condition – upon which welfare states depend.
Welfare chauvinism is impacted both by these social concerns and by more material fiscal
concerns. Hansen, Schultz-Nielsen and Tranaes (2015) find that the fiscal impact of migration to
Denmark is significantly impacted by the country from which immigrants come. While
migration from Western countries has a significant positive fiscal impact, the fiscal impact of
migration from non-Western countries is heavily negative. While Western migration generates a
surplus, non-Western migration causes a deficit. This can be explained by non-Western
immigrants’ relationship with the labor market: they tend to participate in the workforce less and
retire early. Denmark’s ability to strengthen the welfare state’s fiscal foundations through
immigration is thus dependent upon the type of immigration Denmark receives.
Whether immigration is evaluated as a net positive or net negative, socially or
financially, for Denmark does not necessarily determine whether the Danish welfare state
includes or excludes immigrants. Two hypotheses attempt to explain the relationship between
welfare availability and immigration. The dualization hypothesis holds that welfare generosity
correlates negatively with foreigners’ access to welfare benefits for two reasons. First, generous
welfare systems may serve as “magnets” for migration as foreigners are attracted to the promise
of social benefits. The higher the number of foreigners seeking benefits in a welfare state, the
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higher the budgetary strain. Second, immigration threatens societal ethnic homogeneity, which
undermines the social trust upon which the success of welfare states relies. In other words, while
the average Dane is likely to support welfare benefits for other, more disadvantaged Danes, s/he
is far less likely to support such benefits for foreigners, with whom s/he lacks “trust.” The
generosity hypothesis holds that welfare generosity correlates positively with foreigners’ access
to benefits. The decommodifying policies inherent to the structure of most generous welfare
states decrease economic competition and protect workers’ rights, thereby reducing the
possibilities of foreigners being seen as a threat. Furthermore, generous welfare systems tend to
adhere to egalitarian principles and non-discriminatory ideologies that mediate the tendency to
identify foreigners as “the other.” Such principles are applied practically through the nonestablishment of screening mechanisms, which would identify certain people as “the other” via
legal means (checking of ID documents, implementation of mandatory reporting/notification
obligations, etc.). Romer (2017) finds that, in general, the generosity hypothesis is more
parsimonious, though she notes that Denmark’s restriction of immigrants’ rights is a minor
exception to the norm.
Jorgensen and Meret (2012) argue that Danish politics have afforded relatively little
attention to irregular migration because it is a “marginal phenomenon.” The applicability of this
finding post-2012 seems to be contradicted by the rhetoric and policies from Denmark’s major
political parties, but the authors’ identification of the mechanisms Denmark uses to control
migration remains salient. Danish solutions to irregular migration center upon control
mechanisms aimed at restricting migrants’ access to the country and return policies aimed at
repatriating the migrants that have gained entry. In addition to implementing measures that
directly inhibit asylum seekers’ access to asylum, Denmark has implemented policies of
“indirect deterrence” aimed at persuading foreigners not to enter the country in the first place.
This is usually accomplished by implementing excessive conditionality for access to citizenship,
residence rights and social benefits, thereby reducing the likelihood of foreigners qualifying to
receive them (Esmark and Schoop 2017). Some of these measures correspond to direct
retrenchment; these are the types of measures I predict will be supported legislatively by S.

Danish Welfare: In the Trenches?
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Three attempted proposals constituting welfare retrenchment warrant attention as they
indicate S and DF’s hierarchy of preferences on welfare retrenchment. The first proposal
involved tax reform, analysis of which is useful for two reasons. First, tax cuts are a form of
welfare retrenchment that governments perceive as less electorally risky than more blatant forms
of welfare retrenchment. This implies that parties which propose and support tax reform are
relatively insulated from electoral consequence for doing so – or, at least, they perceive that they
are. Second, tax cuts tend to have a partisan dimension in Denmark. While leftwing governments
tend to create more forms of taxation to provide the welfare state with additional sources of
income, rightwing governments tend to retrench the welfare state by decreasing its income flow
via tax cuts (Klitgard and Elmelund-Praestaeker 2014). Therefore, if S’s rightwing shift
influenced it to support general welfare retrenchment to a greater degree than it did in the past, it
is likely that this would be evidenced in its stance on tax reform. In 2018, V concluded an
agreement with DF to increase restrictions on the residence conditions under which citizens
would receive unemployment benefits. The initial version of the proposal required people to
have lived in Denmark for 7 of the past 8 years, but trade unions and left-wing parties, including
S, expressed concern over the proposal, noting that it would exclude Danish citizens who had
worked abroad from receiving benefits (Gadd 2018). In the final version of the bill, exceptions
were made for Danish citizens working for companies overseas and workers who had lived in
EU countries. Residence requirements were changed to 7 out of the past 12 years, but despite the
changes, S, EL, ALT, RV and SF opposed the bill, which ultimately passed with support from
DF, V, LA and KF (Folketinget 2019). It was estimated that that 80% of individuals affected by
this proposal will be from non-EU countries, which employment minister Troels Lund Poulsen
(V) said “[has] always been the intention” (Gadd 2018). Despite the bill’s potential adverse
consequences for Danish workers, DF supported the bill. Its support can be explained in part by
the bill’s consequences for immigrants and in part by the party’s hostility to foreign labor. While
it is proven electorally popular for S to accommodate welfare chauvinism by supporting policy
that excludes foreigners, S did not support the proposal. This indicates that its support for the
welfare state in general has not changed, though its stance towards extension of welfare benefits
to foreigners has. The consequences for Danish workers outweighed the consequences for
foreigners in S’s calculation, but not in DF’s calculation.
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The second proposal centered upon the long-contested issue of tax cuts. In early 2018, the
V-led government scrapped plans to cut taxes when it failed to garner enough support from other
parties. S refused to support the proposal on the basis of its “lack of welfare” (The Local
Denmark 2017). DF predicated its support for the proposal on the government’s willingness to
revoke refugees’ residence rights; V would not accommodate the request and DF refused to
support the bill. The government plans to introduce new tax cuts targeting low-earning workers,
which DF has promised to support (Levring and Rigillo 2018). S responded by introducing its
own tax plan, which it promises to implement if it forms a government after 2019 general
elections. The plan includes, among other things, caps on salaries for executives, extension of
employee bonuses, a doubling of inheritance tax, and a 10 percent increase on the tax ceiling for
capital gains (Levring 2018). Despite the potential negative implications for Danes, including the
blue-collar workers that comprise much of DF’s voting base, the party was prepared to support
the proposal if the consequences for foreigners were sufficiently negative. S not only opposed
the proposal on the basis of these potential adverse effects, but released its own proposal in an
attempt to attest to its welfare “credentials.” As with the retirement proposal, for S, the potential
consequences for Danes outweighed the political utility of accommodating welfare chauvinism.
For DF, the opposite was true.
The third proposal related to Denmark’s retirement age. In 2011, the V government, with
support from DF and RV, passed a bill reforming the country’s early retirement scheme, a
reform that would eventually raise the retirement age to 69. S and SF, supported by some labor
unions, opposed the effort, arguing that it would have negative consequences for blue-collar
workers whose work was mentally and physically exhausting. Despite the passing of the bill at
the time, the part of the agreement that intermittently raised the retirement age to 67.5 was
shelved in 2017 due to opposition from DF and S. The proposal was part of a market-related
reform, aimed at combatting the lack of available workers in Denmark by increasing the number
of years Danes spent working. S’s behavior is indicative of its traditional opposition to such
reforms. DF’s support for the bill indicates the party’s lack of consistency on welfare
retrenchment and underscores the difficulty in predicting DF’s preferences on such legislation.
Voting behavior on this issue would appear to fit with existing literature. While support for the
Danish welfare state remains high across political parties, S and the center-right parties diverge
significantly. S, in general, favors expansion of the welfare state, advocating higher taxation to
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finance higher public spending. While V and its bloc do not consistently advocate retrenchment,
it is significantly less likely to seek expansion of the welfare state and is more likely to propose
market-focused reforms. Focus on such reforms, however, declined from 1970-2003, due partly
to the popularity of the welfare state among citizens and the unpopularity of retrenchment among
political parties. S tends to oppose welfare retrenchment and market-focused reforms regardless
of whether it is part of the government or opposition (Nygard 2006).
Despite its rightward shift, it is not surprising that S refuses to support welfare
retrenchment. Arndt (2013) demonstrates that the S-led government of 1993-2001 was
electorally punished by voters for its role in welfare retrenchment. The party’s traditional
working-class voter base, disillusioned with S because of its liberal immigration policy and its
backsliding on social democracy as evidenced by its willingness to retrench, moved increasingly
to the Danish People’s Party. This finding fits within a larger paradigm of voter reaction to
welfare retrenchment. Schumacher et al (2012) found that, in general, welfare retrenchment leads
to negative electoral consequences for the parties that implement and support it. The
consequences are especially severe for center-left, welfare-supportive parties, as voters perceive
a sort of betrayal that decreases their willingness to vote for the party. Parties that are perceived
to be more welfare-critical are electorally punished as a result of their role in retrenchment, but
not to the degree that welfare-supportive parties are. Thus, the electoral consequences of welfare
retrenchment are different for political parties based on voters’ perceptions of their stances on
welfare, and leftist governments suffer the most.
Currently, S has electoral incentives for accommodating welfare chauvinism. Should it
receive a mandate to form a government after the 2019 general election, it will have political
incentives as well. Welfare retrenchment may well help S leave the opposition, form a
government and pass laws that fit with its welfare expansionary platform, but what S is not able
to do is accommodate DF’s indirect welfare chauvinism. If S acquiesces to such retrenchment of
the welfare state – even if the ostensible target is Denmark’s foreign-born population – its
credentials as the political establishment’s foremost defender of the welfare state will come into
question at precisely the moment it is arguably being redeemed. As Arndt (2013) established,
voters are willing to electorally punish S for instigating welfare retrenchment, even if doing so
results in the election of a party that also favors retrenchment. This was evidence in the 2011
election, when voters spurned the center-left administration of Helle Thorning-Schmidt due to
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the indirect retrenchment it implemented. While some of its retrenchment had a clear bias against
foreigners, retrenchment rolled back benefits for citizens in general, which proved unpopular
(Jorgensen and Thomsen 2016: 331).

Center-Left and Far-Right: Conflict or Convergence?
As the ideological differences between Denmark’s leftwing parties have increased, the
potential for the bloc to work together has decreased. Traditionally, before the Parliament’s
summer break, Denmark’s red (left-wing) bloc and blue (right-wing) bloc release statements
noting shared goals and evaluating the general political arena. In 2018, the practice clearly
showed disunity among the red bloc, as the RV, ALT and SF refused to endorse the statement
written by S. Instead, they released their own, criticizing Frederiksen’s party for its role in
passing anti-immigrant legislation (Barrett 2018a). Less than a week later, Frederiksen
announced that, should S win Denmark’s next general election, it would seek to form a minority
government without support from alternative leftist parties, breaking a 25-year cooperation
agreement among parties in the blue bloc. The reason, Frederiksen said, is the “blurring of lines”
between the mainstream left and right-wing, especially on immigration, an issue on which the
positions of S and SF are no longer compatible (Barret 2018b).
Nedergaard (2017) argues that three factors explain the Social Democratic leadership’s
turn towards accommodation of welfare chauvinism. The first is informed by the Scandinavian
welfare state’s “closed” condition as articulated by Freeman. S, which perceives and promotes
itself as the welfare state’s foremost political defender, has come to see large-scale migration
from developing nations as a threat to the existence of the welfare state. In this view, restriction
of welfare for immigrants is necessary to prevent welfare retrenchment on a larger scale. The
second involves the party’s reckoning with its past. In the 1980s, S-led governments liberalized
migration policy, which ultimately became unpopular with electorates. This second factor
follows from the first, as S could no longer viably tout its pro-welfare credentials as voters
blamed it for allowing the large-scale migration that necessarily leads to welfare retrenchment.
The third factor is the loss of S’s traditional voting base, as working-class voters have
increasingly defected to DF and V. S has thus been deprived of a reliable voting base; most
likely unable to win support of high-earners because of its opposition to tax cuts and support of
high public spending, S must win back its traditional working-class base to survive. The shift to
the right led by Frederiksen, has spared S from the electorally bleak fate that has befallen much
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of Europe’s center left, but such a departure from the party’s traditional ideology will necessitate
a sharp break from its liberal allies. Whether this is a choice S is willing to make will only be
made clear in the next election.
Ideologically, S and DF intersect in a way uncharacteristic of the center-left and far-right.
Their parties’ platforms converge in four critical areas: concern over the rollback of workers’
rights; income inequality; unregulated neoliberal policies resulting from globalization; and the
challenges of integrating refugees and migrants into a closed system. Both would, on the surface,
appear to oppose welfare retrenchment for natives. Both oppose lowering taxes on top earners
and raising the age at which citizens may retire and qualify for state pensions; both support
higher public spending to support the welfare state. A key difference between S and DF is the
scope of their respective program’s focus. S, despite its opposition to neoliberal market policies,
acknowledges the integration of the Danish economy into the European and global economies,
and thus its program attacks globalism’s adverse effects without opposing globalism per se. DF,
on the other hand, opposes globalism on principle (Helbak and Krogsbaek 2018). Though the
difference in scope affects the parties’ abilities to implement coherent policy – a task S is more
likely to accomplish than DF – it does not translate into a fundamentally different stance on the
welfare state; indeed, on paper, the two parties’ platforms seem compatible.
S's shift to the right has thus far failed to deliver electoral consequences. An opinion poll
in August gauged S’s popularity to be 26% - the same as its popularity immediately before the
2015 general election (The Local Denmark 2018). Therefore, despite the change in the party’s
direction has not translated to a change in support. With general elections in June 2019, however,
S finds itself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, if it continues accommodating
DF’s welfare chauvinism, it risks alienating its liberal voters and its traditional allies. This is
likely to be a particularly difficult option if DF promotes indirect retrenchment, which would
impact native Danes as well as immigrants. Accommodating welfare chauvinism in such
conditions would almost certainly lead to electoral consequences. On the other hand, if S reverts
to its previous immigration and multiculturalism policies, it risks being punished electorally.

Methodology
I hypothesize that electoral pressures will compel S to accommodate welfare chauvinism,
but that it will not retrench directly because doing so is electorally costly; instead, it will retrench
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directly. To evaluate this claim, I analyze bills voted upon by the Danish parliament (Folketing)
that concern immigrants’ access to Danish citizenship, residency and/or benefits proposed by the
competent ministries1 since the inauguration of the Anders Fogh Rasmussen cabinet in 2004, as
these are the earliest legislative records kept systematically by the Folketing online. This analysis
includes only those bills that were voted on by the Folketing; it does not include bills in
committee at the time of writing or bills that were shelved in committee. More regulatory bills –
for example, those that transpose European directives into national law – and those that impose
minor structural changes on administrations and agencies (i.e. those that change rules for
appointing members of immigration advisory boards) are not included in this analysis. Laws
relating to temporary tourist visas, extraordinary acts granting citizenship to persons of domestic
importance, and other bills irrelevant to the purpose of this paper are not analyzed. The full list
of analyzed bills, with summaries of content, can be found in the appendix. Comprehensive
overviews of the bills may be found, in Danish, on the Folketing website.
Each bill is assigned either a plus (+) or minus (-) sign indicating its implications for
foreigners in Denmark. Those bills marked with a plus (+) have made it easier for foreigners to
gain access to the country’s social benefits via either eased access to residency and citizenship or
eased direct access to benefits. Those bills marked with a minus (-) have made it more difficult
for foreigners to gain access to these benefits via either restricted access to residency and
citizenship or restricted direct access to benefits. This is not a subjective evaluation of whether
the bills are “good” or “bad”; it indicates only whether they have positive or negative
implications for foreigners’ access to social benefits in Denmark.
I identify five forms of welfare retrenchment implemented by Danish ministries in the
area of immigrant rights and affairs: Revocation, Financial Obligation, Denial of Access, Social
1

The Danish ministry which handles refugee, immigration and integration affairs has been abolished, reestablished
and renamed multiple times, although for the period analyzed here it has always existed in some form. The Ministry
for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, established in the cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V) existed until
2011, when it was abolished by Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S). Competences for immigration policy
were transferred to the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration from 2011-2013; the
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and Integration from 2013-2014; and the Ministry of
Justice and the Ministry for Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations until the end of the government’s
mandate. In 2015 a different government led by Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V) was elected. From 28 June 2015 to 28
November 2016, the government was comprised only of ministers from V. During this period, the ministry that
introduced legislation on immigration affairs was the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing. Following
the reestablishment of a three-party (V, LA, KF) cabinet in late 2016, the ministry that introduced relevant
legislation was the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, under the same minister. Competence for housing
policy was relocated to another ministry.
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Obligation, and Repatriation Incentive. Revocation refers to authorities’ rights to deprive an
individual of rights to residence, citizenship, and/or benefit that the citizen would have enjoyed
prior to the passing of the law. Financial obligation refers to the increase in or introduction of
cost for programs that previously were free or less costly; in other words, the transfer of burden
of payment from state to individual user. Denial of Access characterizes a law that aims to
restrict the number of people able to access, or exclude members of a certain group from
accessing, residence, citizenship and/or. Social obligation refers to the obligation of an individual
seeking residence, citizenship and/or benefits to prove adherence to a socially-constructed
criteria, i.e. the obligation of a refugee to prove respect for “Danish values” or attest to their
social integration potential. Social obligation may be construed as a form of denial of access, but
because a distinction must be made between normative laws and restrictions (i.e. increase in
waiting periods) and socially-constructed obligations, two categories must be used. Repatriation
incentive, while not a way to deny foreigners access to social benefits per se, nonetheless aims to
decrease access of foreigners to residence and/or citizenship. For the purposes of this research, it
is evaluated as +/- (neutral), as it neither directly restricts nor expands foreigners’ access to social
rights in Denmark.

Results
These results are derived from the larger dataset found in the appendix. The left column indicates
the type of restriction in the bill. The middle column denotes the number of bills that included
this type of restriction and the right column indicates how S voted. The number of markings in
the right column do not always correspond to the number in the middle column because some
votes included more than one type of restriction. The number of restrictions do not correspond to
the total number both for this reason and because some of the bills voted upon were positive and
thus included no restrictions.
2018-2019
Restriction Type

#

S vote

Revocation

2

+, +

Financial Obligation

2

+, /

Denial of Access

3

+, +, +
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Social Obligation

1

/

Revocation

3

+, +, +

Financial Obligation

1

+

Denial of Access

12

/ (2), - (2), + (8)

1

+

1

+

9

+ (8), - (1)

1

+

Denial of Access

7

-, + (7)

Social Obligation

3

-, +, +

Denial of Access

1

-

Social Obligation

1

-

1

-

Repatriation Incentive
2017-2018

Social Obligation
Repatriation Incentive
2016-2017
Revocation
Financial Obligation
Denial of Access
Social Obligation
Repatriation Incentive
2015-2016
Revocation
Financial Obligation

Repatriation Incentive
2014-2015: Government of Rasmussen
Revocation
Financial Obligation

Repatriation Incentive
2014-2015: Government of Thorning-Schmidt
Revocation
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Financial Obligation
Denial of Access
Social Obligation
Repatriation Incentive
2013-2014
Revocation
Financial Obligation
Denial of Access
Social Obligation
Repatriation Incentive

2

+, +

1

+

1

+

Revocation

2

+, -

Financial Obligation

1

-

Denial of Access

2

-, -

1

-

1

-

2012-2013
Revocation
Financial Obligation
Denial of Access
Social Obligation
Repatriation Incentive

2011-2012
All positive laws; no restrictions.
2010-2011: no laws.
2010-2011: Government of Lokke Rasmussen

Social Obligation
Repatriation Incentive
2009-2010
Revocation
Financial Obligation
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Denial of Access

1

+

Social Obligation

2

+, +

Repatriation Incentive

1

+

1

+

2

+, -

Denial of Access

1

+

Social Obligation

1

-

Repatriation Incentive

1

-

1

+

Denial of Access

1

+

Social Obligation

2

-, /

2008-2009
Revocation
Financial Obligation
Denial of Access
Social Obligation
Repatriation Incentive
2007-2008
All positive laws; no restrictions.
2006-2007
Revocation
Financial Obligation

2005-2006
Revocation
Financial Obligation

Repatriation Incentive
2004-2005
Revocation
Financial Obligation
Denial of Access

1

+

Social Obligation

2

+, +
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Repatriation Incentive

The increase in the number of immigration-related bills voted upon by the Folketing
corresponds with the increase of asylum seekers received by Denmark during the migration
“crisis” in Europe. Obviously, an increase in the total number of bills increases the likelihood of
S to vote a certain way, thus it is not useful to calculate the percentage change of S’s support,
opposition and abstentions. The use of percentages to analyze S’s voting behavior during each
time period is not unproblematic due to the small number of bills, but while the percentages
should not be considered in isolation, they are useful for portraying S’s voting behavior. In the
2018-2019 period, S abstained on 2 of 8 bills with restrictions (25%) and opposed none (0%). In
the 2017-2018 period, S abstained on 2 of 17 bills (12%) and opposed 2 (12%). In the 2016-2017
period, S opposed 1 of 11 bills (9%). In the 2015-2016 period, S opposed 2 of 10 bills (20%). In
the 2014-2015 period for which a V-led government was in power, S opposed both bills (100%).
In the 2014-2015 period for which an S-led government was in power, S opposed the only bill
(100%). In the 2013-2014 and 2012-2013 periods, S opposed no bills. In the 2010-2011 period, S
opposed 5 of 6 bills (83%). In the 2009-2010 period, S opposed 1 of 5 bills (20%). In the 20082009 period, S opposed 1 of 3 bills (33%). In the 2006-2007 period, S opposed 2 of 3 bills
(67%). In the 2005-2006 period, S opposed 1 (25%) and abstained on 1 (25%) of 4 bills. In the
2004-2005 period, S opposed no bills (0%).
As noted, the small number of relevant bills voted upon by the Folketing makes drawing
conclusions difficult. However, S’s relatively permissive attitude towards restrictive bills during
the V-led government’s tenure (2015-2019) contrasts with its voting behavior during the S-led
government’s tenure (2011-2015), indicating that the loss of the election did indeed result in
“lessons learned.” The likelihood of S voting with DF was also significantly higher during the Vled government’s tenure than during the S-led government’s tenure, as the tables in the appendix
show. Perhaps a more useful indicator of changes in S’s voting behavior can be found by
analyzing what parties S tended to vote with during its tenure as opposition under the first and
second Rasmussen cabinets. In the 2018-2019 period, S voted with DF on 5 out of 6 bills and
only voted with its former coalition partner RV on 3. In 2017-2018, it voted with DF 10 times
and voted with RV 8 times. In 2016-2017, it voted with DF 9 times, including one unusual
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instance in which both sides opposed the government, and voted with RV 5 times. In 2015-2016,
it voted with DF 9 times and with RV 3 times.

Conclusion
The findings above reflect tentative support for my hypothesis. Voting records also
identify another form of direct retrenchment supported by S: encouragement of repatriation of
foreigners to their home countries. S has accommodated DF’s welfare chauvinism by supporting
direct retrenchment in three ways: by making it more difficult for foreigners to acquire the
conditions under which they may claim and receive welfare benefits in two ways: a) by making it
more difficult for foreigners to meet the residency and citizenship requirements necessary for
access to benefits and b) by expanding the conditions under which residency and citizenship
rights may be revoked and c) by encouraging repatriation. Though repatriation is more voluntary
than exclusion and expulsion, it indicates a desire on the part of the parties that vote for it to
extend fewer benefits to fewer foreigners, and thus it constitutes a form of direct retrenchment.
Based on these findings, I anticipate that, in the future, S will continue to retrench directly
because indirect retrenchment almost certainly entails negative electoral consequences. An
upcoming general election, due to be held in June 2019, increases S’s prerogatives for pursuing
welfare chauvinism accommodation and welfare state support.
This paper analyzed only the bills voted upon by the Folketing that met certain
specifications; a more systemic, robust analysis would account for bills that were proposed but
not voted on. This would allow for a more thorough analysis of how S and DF react to proposals
ostensibly aimed at reducing access to benefits for foreigners but effectively infringe upon native
Danes’ access to those benefits. It was beyond the scope of this project to analyze such
legislation here, but doing so would provide a clearer picture of the two parties’ relationship with
migration and welfare policy. Because of the small number of bills analyzed, the study suffers
from overdetermination; while the findings tentatively support the hypothesis, the hypothesis
should be tested further and more systematically.
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Appendix

Law
L166

L152

L140

L133

L81
L80

L55B

2018-2019: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF).
Ministry of Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V)
Content
+/- Retrenchment Status
Support
Opposition
Type
Extension of British
+
/
Confirmed S, D, V,
/
citizens’ rights in event of
EL, LA,
no-deal Brexit
ALT, RV,
SF, KF
Legalize expulsion of
Revocation
Confirmed S, DF, V, EL, ALT
foreigners who violate
RV, SF,
laws on criminalization of
Denial of
KF
mental violence; Restrict
Access
access to residence
permits for foreigners
with prison records
Introduction of cap for
Revocation
Confirmed S, DF, V, EL, ALT,
family reunifications;
LA, KF
RV, SF
further penalty for
Denial of
violation of residency and
Access
entry laws; increased
leeway for authorities to
revoke refugees’ residence
permits; rephrasing so that
refugees’ residence
permits made temporary
Compel users of au pair
Financial
Confirmed S, DF,
V, LA,
scheme to pay for Danish Obligation
EL, SF
ALT, RV,
language lessons
KF
Raise naturalization fee;
Financial
Confirmed DF, V,
EL, ALT,
allow Minister to set
Obligation
LA, KF
RV, SF
conditions for citizenship
ceremonies, upon which
Social
conference of citizenship
Obligation
is conditional, including
demonstrating respect for
Danish values
Restriction of conditions
Denial of
Confirmed S, DF, V, /
for spousal reunification
Access
EL, LA,
ALT, RV,
SF, KF
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Abstentions
/

/

/

/

S

/

L239

L231

L225

L222

L215

L197

L196

2017-2018: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF).
Ministry of Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V)
Increase residence
Denial of
Confirmed DF, V,
AL, ALT,
requirement and
Access
LA, KF
RV, SF
introduce employment
requirement to earn right
to education and cash
benefits
Make spousal
Denial of
Confirmed S, DF, V, EL, ALT,
reunification conditional
Access
LA, KF
RV
upon likelihood of
spouse’s successful
integration; connection
requirement replaced by
integration requirement
with language
component; introduction
of residence requirement
for individuals seeking
reunification of spouse,
including limits on where
residence can be located
Introduction of payment
Financial
Confirmed S, DF, V, EL, ALT,
obligations for education
Obligation
LA, KF
RV, SF
for students, foreign
workers, and EU citizens
Effective grant of
+
/
Confirmed S, V, EL,
DF
citizenship to 1953 adults
LA, ALT,
and 472 children together
RV, SF,
with parents
KF
Abolition of au pair
Denial of
Rejected
DF, EL,
S, V, LA,
scheme on grounds that it
Access
SF
RV, KF
facilitates “wage
dumping” and undeclared
work
Continue provisions to
Denial of
Confirmed S, DF, V, EL, ALT,
establish temporary
Access
LA, KF
RV, SF
residences for refugees;
increase police power to
detain refugees to verify
identity
Obliges authorities to
+/- Repatriation
Confirmed S, DF, V, EL, ALT,
inform foreigners about
Incentive
LA, SF,
RV
repatriation; strengthen
KF
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S

SF

/

/

ALT

/

/

L189

L180

L156

L145
A

L141

L140

L120

L97

structural factors for
repatriation; provide
incentives for repatriation
Changes to wage
requirement for
foreigners employed in
certain types of work, to
ensure that such
employment does not
affect the wages of
Danish workers
Ease ability of authorities
to expel foreigners
deemed no longer in need
of protection
Introduction of shorter
entry bans so that more
individuals may be
denied entry; establish
framework for expulsion
of foreigners charged
with crimes
Tightening of regulations
guiding asylum seekers’
access to housing and
labor market
Ease rules for foreigners
seeking secondary
employment and
volunteer work
Ease access to residence
permits for foreigners
who worked with
international
organizations in
Denmark
Reduction of integration
allowance to incentivize
job-seeking
Simplify rules for
distribution of refugees
among municipalities;
restricts right of refugees
to be rehoused if they
move away from

-

Denial of
Access

Rejected

DF, EL

S, V, LA,
ALT, RV,
KF

-

Revocation

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, RV,
SF, KF

EL, ALT

SF

Revocation

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

AL, ALT,
RV, SF

+

/

/

DF

+

/

Confirmed S, V, EL,
LA, ALT,
RV, SF,
KF
Confirmed S, V, EL,
LA, ALT,
RV, SF,
KF

DF

/

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

S

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, RV,
KF

EL, ALT,
SF

/
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L96

L95B

L94

L80

L46

L204

L188

L175

municipality to which
they were assigned
Increase right of
authorities to refuse to
issue travel documents to
foreigners if suspicion of
sale/abuse of travel
documents
Removal of “special,
easy” access to judicial
trial in family
reunification cases
involving children
Ease access to labor
market and residence
permits for foreigners
with “innovative business
ideas”
Set quota of 500 for
refugees issued with
residence permit annually
Restrict access to
permanent residence
permit for foreigners who
have “opposed the
clarification of their
identity”

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, RV,
SF, KF

EL, ALT

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

+

/

Confirmed S, V, LA,
ALT, RV,
SF, KF

DF, EL

/

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, V, LA,
KF

/

-

Revocation

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

DF, EL,
ALT, RV,
SF
EL, ALT,
RV, SF

2016-2017: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF).
Ministry of Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V)
Denial of education for
Denial of
Confirmed S, DF, V, EL, ALT,
adult foreigners in
Access
LA, SF,
RV
reception centers;
KF
provisions for
accommodation of
unaccompanied minors
Increase use of
Denial of
Confirmed S, DF, V, EL, ALT,
biometrics/fingerprints
Access
LA, KF
RV, SF
and personal photographs
to verify asylum seekers’
identities
Facilitate newcomers’
+
/
Confirmed S, DF, V, ALT
access to labor market
EL, LA,
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/

/

/

/

/

L174

L163

L162

L161

L154

L153

L135

L119

L82

L51

RV, SF,
KF
Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, SF,
KF
Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, RV,
KF

Increase incentives for
voluntary repatriation of
foreigners
Ease family reunification
for some professionals
affected by the repeal of
the 26-year rule
Repeal of 26-year rule for
family reunification

+/-

Repatriation
Incentive

EL, ALT,
RV

/

+

/

EL, ALT,
SF

/

+

/

Confirmed S, V, LA,
KF

DF, EL,
ALT, RV,
SF
S, V, LA,
ALT, RV,
SF, KF

/

Increase in minimum
salary necessary for
foreign workers to legally
stay in Denmark
Increase restrictions for
obtaining residence
permit, including increase
in residence requirement
and requirement for selfsufficiency
Enactment of “emergency
brake” allowing Denmark
to reject asylum seekers
at border in crisis
situations
Clarification of
foreigners’ salary
requirements under
amounts scheme
Restrict authorities’
abilities to revoke student
residence permits in case
of illegal work

-

Denial of
Access

Rejected

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF,
EL, SF

V, LA,
ALT, RV,
KF

/

+

/

Confirmed S, V, EL,
LA, ALT,
RV, SF,
KF

DF

/

/

/

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/

DF, EL

2016-2017: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V).
Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing.
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V)
Ease access to residence
+
/
Confirmed S, DF, V,
permits for highlyEL, LA,
qualified workers/PhD
ALT, RV,
candidates
SF, KF
Increased monitoring of
Denial of
Confirmed S, DF, V,
foreigners with criminal
Access
LA, KF
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/

L50

L49

L48

L191
A

L191
B

L188

L169

records; increased
penalties for violating
notification obligation
Introduction of obligation
of religious figures to
commit to compliance
with Danish law and take
course on Danish law and
order prior to being
granted residence permit
Compels authorities to
expel criminal foreigners
unless doing so expressly
contradicts Denmark’s
international obligations
(abolition of changes
made by former
government)
Introduction of sanctions
list naming individuals to
be banned entry to
Denmark on basis of
public order

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
EL, LA,
ALT, RV,
SF, KF

/

/

-

Revocation

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, SF,
KF

EL, ALT,
RV

/

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/

/

/

DF, EL,
LA

/

V, LA,
ALT, RV,
KF

/

2015-2016: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V).
Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing.
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V)
Abolition of 2 year
Denial of
Confirmed S, DF, V,
deadline for family
Access
KF, LA
reunification in cases
involving children
Allow cash-benefit and
+
/
Confirmed S, DF, V,
educational aid recipients
EL, LA,
who become integration
ALT, RV,
benefit recipients to
SF, KF
retain already-earned
benefits
Provide benefits to
+
/
Confirmed S, V,
companies that provide
ALT, RV,
foreigners and refugees
KF
with practical training
and education
Cancellation of green
Denial of
Confirmed S, DF,
card scheme on basis of
Access
EL, SF
“wage-dumping”
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L168

L111

L87

L62

L60

Increase foreign workers’
minimum income
requirement for residence
under amounts scheme
Extension of integration
benefit to create
“incentive to work” and
“be integrated”
Postpone family
reunification for persons
with temporary
protection; abolition of
“easy” access to
permanent residence
permit for refugees;
reduction of cash benefit
for asylum seekers; allow
authorities to search
refugees’ belongings and
confiscate items to help
state cover expenses for
these refugees; condition
selection of quota
refugees on those
refugees’ potential for
integration; increase
ability of authorities to
withdraw residence
permits of refugees who
visit home country;
tightening of
requirements for
obtaining indefinite
residence permit
Allow authorities to stop
transportation services
between Denmark and
other countries in
extraordinary cases
Require foreigners taking
citizenship test to
demonstrate knowledge
of Danish society, culture
and history

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF,
EL, SF

V, LA,
ALT, RV,
KF

/

-

Denial of
Access/Social
Obligation

Confirmed DF, V,
LA, KF

S, EL,
ALT, RV,
SF

/

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/

Social
Obligation

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/

-

Social
Obligation

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/
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L53A

L54B

L2

L79

L99

L72

L44

Require foreigners
born/raised in Denmark
to apply for nationality
Allow acquisition of
Danish nationality by
adult to extend to adult’s
children

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed S, DF, V,
LA, KF

EL, ALT,
RV, SF

/

+

/

Confirmed S, DF, V,
EL, LA,
ALT, RV,
SF, KF

/

/

2014-2015: Cabinet of Lokke-Rasmussen Cabinet (V).
Ministry of Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations.
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V)
Replacement of
Denial of
Confirmed DF, V,
S, EL,
education aid and cash
Access/Social
LA, KF
ALT, RV,
assistance for newlyObligation
SF
arrived foreigners with
integration allowance

/

2014-2015: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt Cabinet (S, RV).
Ministry of Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations.
Minister: Manu Sareen (RV)
Reinstatement of
+
/
Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, LA, /
previous more lenient
EL
KF
rules for granting
refugees access to state
pensions

Increase ability of
government to revoke
residence permits for
foreigners who
participate in armed
conflict abroad
Introduction of
temporary protection
status for individuals
fleeing serious conflict in
home country
Increase right of former
citizens to regain
citizenship; allow dual
citizenship

Ministry of Justice.
Minister: Mette Frederiksen (S)
Revocation
Confirmed V, DF, S,
RV, SF,
LA, KF

EL, UFG

/

+

/

Confirmed V, S, DF,
RV, LA,
KF

SF, EL,
UFG

/

+

/

Confirmed V, S, RV,
SF, EL,
LA, UFG

DF, KF

/
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L117
A

L117
B

L186

L162
A

L162
B

L141

L190

2013-2014: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF).
Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and Integration.
Minister: Anette Vilhelmsen (SF)
Increase reintegration
+/- Repatriation
Confirmed V, S, DF, /
/
assistance for foreigners
Incentive
RV, SF,
wishing to return to home
EL, LA,
country x
KF, UFG
Ease requirements of
+/- Repatriation
Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, LA, /
repatriation assistance so
Incentive
EL
KF
that more people may
receive it
Ministry of Justice.
Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S)
+
/
Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, LA
EL, KF

Increase right of children
and young adults to have
their residence cases
reviewed
Allow children born to
+
unwed Danes the same
rights to citizenship as
children born to married
Danes
Increase opportunities for +
non-citizens born and
raised in Denmark to
access citizenship
Abolition of guidelines
+
for selecting refugees for
quota system on basis of
integration potential;
introduction of system
under which refugees are
chosen based on their
“needs and expectations”

/

/

/

Confirmed V, S, DF,
RV, SF,
EL, LA,
KF, UFG

/

Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, LA, /
EL, UFG
KF

/

Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, LA, /
EL, UFG
KF

2012-2013: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF).
Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration.
Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S)
Obliges municipalities to +
/
Confirmed S, RF, SF, V, DF, KF
provide refugees with
EL, LA
individualized integration
plans and health
assessments
Carstens 29

/

/

L130

L143

L129
A

L129
B

L101

L180
A

Increase right of asylum
seekers to work and
move outside of asylum
center; extend offer of
private residence to
families with children
after waiting period;
increase incentives for
rejected asylum seekers
to voluntarily repatriate
Increase right of
authorities to revoke
residence permits of
individuals who have
forced another individual
into marriage
Increased right of
trafficked individuals to
temporary residence
permits
Increase right of abused
spouses and children to
stay in Denmark

Ministry of Justice.
Minister: Morten Bodskov (S)
+
/
Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, KF
EL, LA
+/- Repatriation
Incentive

-

Revocation

Confirmed V, S, DF,
RV, SF,
EL, LA,
KF

/

/

+

/

Confirmed V, S, RV,
SF, EL,
LA, KF

DF

/

+

/

Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, KF
EL

2011-2012: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF).
Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration.
Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S)
Abolish obligation of
+/- / (Removal of Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, KF,
local governments to
Repatriation
EL, LA
SP
provide guidance on
Incentive)
repatriation to foreigners;
abolishes financial
incentives for local
governments to do so

Allow refugees who have
“shown willingness to
integrate” access to
permanent residence
permits in shorter
timeframes

/

Ministry of Justice.
Minister: Morten Bodskov (S)
+
/
Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, KF
EL, LA
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LA

/

/

L180
B

L178

L150
A
L150
B
L104

Increase weight of
Denmark’s international
observations in
considerations of when
foreigners may be
deported
Provide foreigners the
right to vote in municipal
and regional elections
after 3 years of residence
Increase obligation of
authorities to foster
integration of children
Increase children’s
ability to regain lost
residence permits
Allow spousal
reunification for
individuals with lower
financial security than
previous laws permitted;
repeal of point system for
spousal reunification

+

/

Confirmed S, RV, SF, LA, DF,
EL, LA, V KF
(by
mistake)

/

+

/

Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, KF
EL, LA

/

+

/

/

+

/

Confirmed V, S, RV, DF
SF, EL,
LA, KF
Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, KF
EL, LA

+

/

Confirmed S, RV, SF, V, DF, KF
EL, LA

/

/

2010-2011: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt.
No laws made.

L212

L211

L210

2010-2011: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Soren Pind (V)
Compel foreign students Denial of
Confirmed V, DF,
to show more documents
Access
LA, CF
attesting to selfsufficiency and language
requirements
Oblige municipalities to
+/- Repatriation
Confirmed V, DF,
inform foreigners of
Incentive
KF, LA
possibilities for
repatriation
Oblige authorities to
Revocation
Confirmed V, S, DF,
expel criminal foreigners
SF, KF,
unless doing so is
LA
expressly forbidden by
Denmark’s international
obligations
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S, SF, RV,
EL

/

S, SF, RV,
EL, KD

/

RV, EL,
KD

/

L168
L66

L37

L188

L87

L187

L81

L64

Tighten rules for spousal
reunification
Introduction of fees for
family reunification and
study applications
Compel unaccompanied
minors with residence
permit to leave Denmark
upon reaching age 18

-

-

Denial of
Access
Financial
Obligation

Confirmed V, DF, KF S, SF, RV,
EL
Confirmed V, DF,
S, SF, RV,
KF, LA
EL, UFG

/

Revocation

Confirmed V, DF,
KF, LA

S, SF, RV,
EL, UFG

/

S, SF, RV,
EL

/

RV, EL

/

RV, EL

/

RV, EL,
LA

/

EL

S, SF, RV

2009-2010: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Birthe Ronn Hornbech (V)
Increase number of
Revocation
Confirmed V, DF, KF
crimes for which
foreigners can be
expelled; allow
authorities to expel
asylum seekers who go
on vacation in home
countries
Compel spouses seeking Social
Confirmed V, S, DF,
reunification in Denmark
Obligation
SF, KF,
to take immigration test
UFG
Introduction of
Social
Confirmed V, S, DF,
compulsory course in
Obligation
SF, KF
Danish society and
culture for residence
Denial of
permit-seekers; increase
Access
in waiting period for
third-country nationals to
receive voting rights in
Denmark
Encourages repatriation
+/- Repatriation
Confirmed V, S, DF,
for foreigners who do not
Incentive
SF, KF
work
Allow foreign workers to +
/
Confirmed DF, V,
access labor-related
KF, LA
education before access
to Danish education is
gained
2008-2009: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, SF).
Ministry of Refuges, Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Birthe Ronn Hornbech (V)
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/

L174

L69

L132

L131

L218

L198

L93

Increase length of some
entry bans; expand range
of circumstances under
which foreigners may be
expelled
Require foreigners in
Denmark on temporary
stay conditions to report
to police daily

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed V, S, DF,
KF

SF, RV,
EL, LA

/

Revocation
-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed V, DF, KF S, SF, RV,
EL, LA,
UFG

2007-2008: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Birthe Ronn Hornbech (V)
Ease conditions under
+
/
Confirmed V, DF,
S, SF
which skilled foreign
KF, RV,
workers may move to
NY
and work in Denmark
Increase authors’ access
+
/
Confirmed V, DF,
/
to residence permits
KF, RV,
NY, S, SF
2006-2007: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Rikke Hvilshoj (V)
Conference of financial
+/- Repatriation
Confirmed V, DF, KF
support in home country
Incentive
upon rejected asylum
seekers
Increase in waiting
Denial of
Confirmed V, DF,
periods for persons found
Access
KF, S,
to have abused the au
RV, SF,
pair scheme
EL
Introduction of
Social
Confirmed V, DF, KF
integration test as
Obligation
requirement for cash
assistance and some
residence permits;
introduction of
immigration test for
spouses seeking
reunification and
religious figures
2005-2006: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).
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/

EL

/

S, RV, SF,
EL

/

/

/

S, RV, SF,
EL

/

L235

L180

L128

L94

L93

L163

L79A

Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Rikke Hvilshoj (V)
Ease conditions under
+
/
Confirmed V, S, KF,
which Eastern Europeans
RV, SF
can work in Denmark, in
expectation of Eastern
states’ accession to the
EU
Include within
Social
Confirmed V, DF, KF
citizenship test questions
Obligation
about Danish society,
history and culture
Creation of “conditional
Revocation
Confirmed V, S, DF,
expulsion” to make it
KF
easier to expel foreigners
convicted of a crime in
event that they commit
further crimes
Increased penalties for
Denial of
Confirmed V, S, DF,
parents who send their
Access
KF, RV,
children on “restoration
SF
trips” to home country at
expense of child’s
education and integration
Introduction of
Social
Confirmed V, DF, KF
integration contract that
Obligation
must be signed by
foreigner with residence
permit and municipality
issuing that permit

DF, EL

/

S, RV, SF,
EL

/

RV, SF, EL /

EL

/

RV, SF, EL S

2004-2005: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.
Minister: Bertel Haarder (V)
Effectively confers
+
/
Confirmed V, S, KF, DF
/
citizenship upon 3038
RV, SF,
persons and implies that
EL
2064 children may
acquire citizenship
Increase requirement of
Social
Confirmed V, S, DF, RV, SF, EL /
refugees in Denmark to
Obligation
KF
partake of Danish
education and language
learning
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L79B

L78

Provide for selection of
refugees under quota
system on basis of
integration into Danish
society
Increase penalties for
foreigners working
illegally; increased
penalties for persons
found to be facilitating
illegal work

-

Social
Obligation

Confirmed V, S, DF,
KF

RV, SF, EL /

-

Denial of
Access

Confirmed V, S, DF,
KF

RV, SF, EL /
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